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At a press conference two weeks before the US-led invasion of Iraq, flanked by four
“Women for a Free Iraq,”1 Paula Dobriansky, then undersecretary of state for global
affairs, declared: “We are at a critical point in dealing with Saddam Hussein. However
this turns out, it is clear that the women of Iraq have a critical role to play in the future
revival of their society.” For the Bush administration, Iraqi women would not only be
“helping give birth to freedom” in the post-Saddam order.2 US officials spoke publicly
about rape, torture and executions of women under Ba‘th Party rule, implicitly linking
these atrocities to the necessity for US military action.3
These proclamations of support, however, have not necessarily resulted in the
greater empowerment of Iraqi women. Rather, as symbols of the post-Saddam
political order, women have become instruments for achieving (US-defined) security
ends. The Bush administration assumed that Iraqi women constituted a monolithic
bloc, who would unanimously welcome US “liberation” and represent a natural
constituency for the Coalition Provisional Authority’s policies, irrespective of war’s
cost to them and their families. Meanwhile, various political groupings inside Iraq
have also appropriated the experiences of women of “their” communities to further
their own agendas. Caught between the objectives of the US occupation and those of
the competing Iraqi factions, women are finding it increasingly difficult to articulate
an independent voice.
Women’s Gains in Post-Saddam Iraq
The Bush administration would vehemently deny that its interest in empowering Iraqi
women exists only at the level of official rhetoric. In the early days of the occupation,
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established an Office of Women’s Affairs,
which acted as a “clearinghouse,” matching Iraqi civil society groups with donors.
The office also provided technical support for one national and several regional
conferences for women. In addition, there were weekly meetings between the Office
of Women’s Affairs, Iraqi women’s groups, government agencies and anyone else
1 Women for a Free Iraq is a group of Iraqi women living in exile, formed in January 2003 to raise
awareness of women’s experience of persecution under Saddam Hussein. The campaign received
funding from the Washington-based Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Though the
foundation is nominally non-partisan, its president, Clifford May, is a former Republican Party
operative and its board is stacked with prominent neo-conservatives. 
2 Paul Wolfowitz, “Women in the New Iraq,” Washington Post, February 1, 2004. 
3 See, for example, the State Department’s Office of International Women’s Issues fact sheet
distributed on March 20, 2003, accessible online at http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/18877.htm.
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who was interested in promoting women’s interests. CPA head L. Paul Bremer
himself met with Iraqi women activists on several occasions. As one international
NGO worker observed, “The Iraqi women’s organizations got themselves organized
much faster than anyone else so they were constantly in appearance, meeting with
senior officials and pushing for more change.”
The State Department seeks to demonstrate the ongoing “US Commitment to
Women in Iraq” with semi-regular fact sheets produced by the Office of the Senior
Coordinator for International Women’s Issues. These releases report expenditures of
US reconstruction funds to involve more women in formal politics and civil society,
and to improve women’s economic and social situation.4 As a result, women have
been “educated” as voters, and trained as parliamentary candidates and members of
local councils, while women’s groups have been funded as a means of strengthening
civil society. In addition, $10 million in reconstruction money was ring-fenced for
Iraqi women through an Iraqi Women’s Democracy Initiative. The grants were
disbursed quickly in order to “bring women into the political process immediately,”
according to one State Department person involved. 
Within the upsurge of civil society activism following the fall of the repressive
Ba‘th regime, many women became active in claiming their rights to participate in the
rebuilding of their country. Several women’s conferences were held around the
country, at which there was a consensus, irrespective of the “secular-religious” divide,
that women should hold at least 30 percent of all elected offices. In the words of
activist Safiyya al-Suhail, this was “the only way to force [male politicians] to have a
number of skillful women [in leadership positions]”5Women also demonstrated on the
streets of Baghdad, demanding quotas for women in elected assemblies.6 While the
Bush administration can claim that their support for Iraqi women helped to stimulate
this organizing to defend women’s interests, their record with regard to
institutionalizing women’s participation within governance structures is not easy to
defend. 
The Bush administration refused to support quotas for women—despite
establishing de facto quotas for different communal groups on the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC), a consultative body of limited authority created in July 2003. Indeed,
Bremer appointed only three women to the IGC—a move regarded by many as
tokenistic. Despite Bremer’s opposition, Iraqi women activists achieved the
compromise of a 25 percent target for women’s participation in elected assemblies in
the Transitional Administrative Law and the permanent constitution. As a result,
women won over 30 percent of parliamentary seats in the January elections— but only
19 percent in the December 2005 elections (the 25 percent target will be met by
allocating compensatory seats to women).7 Although there is no gender-disaggregated
data for voting, women were certainly among those who braved threats of violence to
cast their ballots. In addition to reaching elected positions to the National Assembly,
women hold positions in municipal and local councils, the Iraqi Electoral
Commission, as well as various government cabinets, including the newly created
portfolio of State Minister for Women’s Affairs. Although women remain
underrepresented in positions of decision-making, their achievements demonstrate
women’s perseverance to participate in the rebuilding of Iraq. 
4 The most recent fact sheet was released on June 22, 2005, and is accessible online at
http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/48464.htm. 
5 Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 2003.
6 Knight Ridder, February 21, 2004.
7 Zainab Naji, “Female Politicians Fear Exclusion,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting Iraq Crisis
Report 174, April 26, 2006. 
Iraqi women’s perseverance was also crucial in helping to stop the passage of
Resolution 137 in early 2004. The proposed law, suggested at the end of 2003 by
members of the IGC when that body was under the rotating chairmanship of ‘Abd
al-‘Aziz al-Hakim, a leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), could have replaced Iraq’s unified personal status code with laws rooted in
more conservative interpretations of shari‘a (Islamic jurisprudence).8 Many women’s
activists (though by no means all) vehemently opposed Resolution 137 as a retrograde
step for women’s position in Iraq.9 Hundreds of Iraqi women demonstrated on the
streets and lobbied the ICG, the CPA and international bodies to prevent the proposal
from passing into law. Following several weeks of protests, Bremer did not ratify the
resolution, thereby rendering it a dead letter. Many supporters of women’s rights
criticize Bremer for taking so long to cancel the proposal. Women’s activists
recognize, however, that Resolution 137 was significant in forming new transnational
networks of solidarity for women’s rights in Iraq.
Iraqi Women in the Diaspora
Since 2003, Iraqi diaspora women have been actively involved in debates about the
political future of Iraq, the role of the US and women’s place in the national fabric.
The centrality of the US in Iraq’s political development, including the building of
political institutions, the drafting of the constitution and the allocation of resources,
places Iraqi women activists in the US in a crucial position. Just like their male
counterparts, Iraqi women activists represent a range of views resonating with the
diversity of political positions inside Iraq. Many US-based Iraqi women activists and
organizations have helped to shape emerging women’s organizations and groups
inside Iraq. However, pro-war and pro-occupation Iraqi women’s associations in the
US have been given the political space and economic means to portray themselves as
representing all Iraqi women and their views. Similar to an array of politicians,
international organizations and NGOs, some Iraqi women’s organizations in the
diaspora tend to claim to speak for Iraqi women, strengthened by their claims of
authenticity due to their origins and credibility due to their suffering under the
previous regime.
Many Iraqi women activists in the US have been working closely with the US
government. Women for a Free Iraq, which then formed the Women’s Alliance for a
Democratic Iraq, represented an important support for US war efforts, and
subsequently received US grants to build organizations on the ground. Women
activists working through the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan and the Shi‘i Da‘wa Party also welcomed the invasion. Islamist women
supporters of Da‘wa, however, expressed suspicions of US intentions and have largely
stayed independent from government-led activities, especially where women are
concerned. In the words of Zaynab K., a Da‘wa and community activist in in
Dearborn, Michigan: “They betrayed us in 1991 when they asked us to rise up against
Saddam and then let his soldiers and tanks slaughter us. Of course, I am happy that
they got rid of Saddam, but I don’t trust them. Their policies on women are part of
their project on imposing their culture on everyone else.”  
In Britain, women’s groups and activists represent a greater range of political
and ideological orientations, in terms of attitudes toward the war, the occupation and
ongoing political developments inside Iraq. Women’s groups affiliated to political
parties exist side by side with more autonomous women’s groups, such as the
8 For more details, see Noga Efrati, “Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law,” 
Middle East Journal 59/4 (Autumn 2005).  
9 Agence France Presse, January 13, 2004 and Washington Post, January 15, 2005.
Organization for Women’s Freedom in Iraq, the Iraqi Women’s League, Iraqi Women
for Peace and Democracy, and Act Together: Women’s Action on Iraq. 
Political and ideological differences are not easily attributable to specific
variables, such as ethnic and religious background. Previous political and personal
experiences of Saddam Hussein’s regime, education, actual experiences of war and
conflict, socialization and current political milieu, as well as personality, are all part of
women’s political trajectories. Alliances and links with women’s or anti-war
organizations in the country of residence might also shape the specific attitudes
towards politics in Iraq. 
Immediately following the invasion, diaspora activists were enthusiastic, but
by 2005 many women had become disillusioned. Najwa R., a middle-aged
professional woman who has been living in exile for over 30 years, first in London
and then Amman in order to be closer to Baghdad, said: “Many Iraqis who lived
outside wanted to come inside to help rebuild the country, but we faced this hatred,
this anger: ‘You did not see it! You did not live it! Why should you come now?’ They
are very bitter about it. I even felt it with my own family.” Najwa, like many other
women, decided to give up because her efforts were not appreciated by people inside
Iraq and because everything had gone from bad to worse. In turn, several women
echoed the sentiments of Baghdad-based pharmacist and NGO founder Hala F., who
complained: “All these women who lived outside for 40 years [and are now coming
back to Iraq] want to tell us what we should do.” Many, although, one has to stress,
not all, diaspora women are perceived to be patronizing and detached from realities on
the ground. 
In comparing the political mobilization of diaspora women in Britain and the
US, one crucial factor mentioned several times by women is the difficulty of
mobilizing when geographically scattered as Iraqi refugees are in the US. While it is
certainly the case that it is much easier for Britain-based Iraqi women activists to meet
in person—mostly in London—geographical dispersion did not explain the lack of a
broad range of women’s activism in places like “Arab Detroit,” with their large
concentrations of Iraqi Chaldeans and Iraqi Shi‘is. 
While ethnic and religious divisions exist in both the US and Britain, the large
presence of secular political parties in Britain, such as the Iraqi Communist Party and
Iraqi National Accord, have contributed to the building of more non-sectarian
alliances and organizations. Moreover, the specific political climate in the US,
particularly post-September 11, has limited the political spaces and resources
available for those not in agreement with US Middle East policy. Several Iraqi women
interviewed in the US mentioned their fear of expressing dissent from US policy, even
more so following the stringent Patriot Act of 2001. In particular, those women who
are not yet US citizens confided that they would not want to jeopardize their chances
of obtaining citizenship or risk prolonging the process. 
Women Losing Ground
Over three years after the invasion, there are many signs that Iraqi women might prove
to be the biggest losers in post-Saddam Iraq. Iraqi women are struggling more than
ever in their day-to-day lives, trying to keep their households going, feed their families
and keep everyone alive. Intisar K., who works as a doctor in a hospital in Baghdad,
spoke for many when she said: “We only have electricity for three to a maximum of
five hours a day. There is not enough clean drinking water. Lack of sanitation is a big
problem and continues to be one of the main causes of malnutrition, dysentery and
death amongst young children.” Women themselves are suffering from inadequate
health care, an ongoing economic crisis and a lack of basic services provided by the
state. The Iraqi infrastructure was already in total disarray after 13 years of the most
comprehensive sanctions regime ever imposed on a country. Three years of
occupation, increased violence and terrorist attacks, as well as one of the biggest
financial corruption scandals in recent history, have prevented any serious
reconstruction and only led living conditions to worsen.10     
Iraqi women suffer particularly acutely from escalating violence and the lack
of a properly functioning police force. The insecurity plaguing Iraq has a distinct and
debilitating impact on the daily lives of women and girls. Although men make up the
majority of the victims of the violence, the climate of fear prevents women from
participating in public life. There are reports that girls are missing weeks or even
months of school or university as their parents fear for their safety in letting them
leave the home.11 Similarly, Amnesty International and others report that many
women are leaving their jobs.   
According to the World Bank, women’s labor force participation is low even
by Middle East standards. Women’s employment has declined not only as a result of
insecurity but also because of liberalization of the economy and privatization of state-
owned enterprises. Fifty-two percent of employed women hold jobs in public-sector
companies, as opposed to a quarter of employed men,12 and so women
disproportionately face the threat of job loss as those companies are sold off. Plans to
downsize the civil service encourage women to take early retirement as a means of
avoiding the security risks entailed in going out to work. Women professionals like
doctors and academics are targeted, just like their male counterparts, in both
kidnappings and non-sectarian assassinations. Those women working for US and
other foreign forces, whether as translators, cleaners or laundry personnel, risk their
lives and those of their families, as they are considered collaborators by the
insurgency.      
Iraqi women also suffer from gender-specific threats and violence. Harassment
and intimidation on the streets, rape and abduction into sex trafficking are particularly
threatening for women whose “sexual honor” is tied up with the honor of whole
families and even communities. They have been victims of so-called honor crimes as
male relatives seek to rid the family of the shame associated with rape and sexual
assault. Women are also assaulted and harassed by Islamist militias that roam the
streets of Iraq’s cities and increasingly control public spaces, like universities,
hospitals and ministries. In the midst of this chaos, there are also numerous gangs of
criminals responsible for many of the lootings, kidnappings and sexual assaults. Some
gangs specialize in kidnapping girls and trafficking them to Gulf countries. Yet the
perpetrators of violence are not all insurgents, militias and criminal gangs. They are
also occupying soldiers searching houses, stopping women at checkpoints and
interrogating women prisoners.     
Conservative Islamist gender ideologies impinge on women’s daily lives.
Many women in Basra, for example, report that they have been forced to wear
headscarves or restrict their movements in fear of harassment from men. Female
students from the University of Basra,  say that since the war ended, groups of men
have begun stopping them at the university gates, shouting at them if their heads were
not covered.13  These reports and accounts are symptomatic of wider conservative
10 See the articles in Third World Quarterly 26/4-5 (June 2005).
11 Iraqi Legal Development Project, The Status of Women in Iraq (Washington, DC: American Bar
Association, 2005), p. 76.
12 UN Development Program, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004 (Baghdad, 2005), p. 116.
13 IRINNews.org, “Iraq: Female Harassment from Religious Conservatives,” April 14, 2004.
trends and various ways in which women are being used in Iraq—as in many other
societies—to demarcate boundaries between “us” and “them.” Islamization here
fulfils two objectives: a break with the previous secular regime of Saddam Hussein
and resistance to the occupying forces. Women are often caught between these two
impulses. On the one hand, many women may support the implementation of the
shari‘a. ‘Azza A., for example, said: “We are Muslims. Of course we want Islamic
law.” Yet many are also unaware that conservative interpretations of Islamic law
could result in restrictions on women’s rights to divorce and freedom of movement,
increased polygamy or changes to child custody laws. 
Islamist political parties and militias in Iraq use women’s dress codes, social
roles and legal rights to signal a radical break with the deposed regime, which was
largely associated with secular politics and even a period of “state feminism” in the
1970s. Conservative Islamist forces are also reacting to the rhetoric of women’s rights
and liberation coming from the White House and Downing Street by appealing to
“cultural authenticity” and “Muslim values.” Ironically, the louder political leaders in
the West shout “women’s rights” while Iraq is occupied, the bigger the backlash
against women’s rights might be in the long run. Widely circulated images of the
female soldier, Pvt. Lynndie England, sexually abusing Iraqi male prisoners at Abu
Ghraib, can only worsen this backlash, as Iraqis ask the question: “Is this what
women’s rights means?”
Gender and the Political Process
Women’s participation is not only threatened by the increasing violence, much of
which is sectarian in nature. Sectarianism is itself a barrier not only to the promotion
of women’s rights but also to the concept of universal citizenship and the political
participation of all Iraqis. Where communal identities come to the fore, women’s
rights and democracy are the losers. Communal political leaders (whether religious,
ethnic or tribal) aim to consolidate political power by imposing conformity upon
“their” communities, while supporting exclusionary and often discriminatory
measures against those who are not perceived as “one of us.” The ensuing pressure to
follow the leader makes political dissent—and also dissent from socially constructed
norms about gender roles and relations—difficult within the “community.” This
pressure contributes to social restrictions on women’s sexuality and their public roles
and behavior. 
To a large extent, trends toward sectarianism have been consolidated by post-
invasion measures.14 It is clear that the Bush administration perceives Iraqi society in
terms of a collection of distinct communities: Sunnis, Shi‘a, Kurds, Christians,
Turkmen and so on. This perception was reflected in the way that the CPA
apportioned seats on the IGC, and later ministries in the interim government,
according to religious sect and ethnicity.15 Subsequently, sectarianism has largely
determined political behavior in Iraq. Political parties formed in preparation for the
January 2005 elections vied for power on the basis of sectarian affiliations rather than
ideological distinctions. Indeed, those groups that failed to win seats or won only a
few seats were those who shunned sectarian politics. This trend was amplified in the
December 2005 elections.16 In the spring of 2006, political parties representing
14 For a wider discussion, see International Crisis Group, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil
Conflict (Amman/Brussels, February 2006). 
15 Raad Alkadiri and Chris Toensing, “The Iraqi Governing Council’s Sectarian Hue,” Middle East
Report Online, August 20, 2003.
16 Patrick Cockburn, “Iraq’s Election Result: A Divided Nation,” The Independent, December 21,
2005.
different communal constituencies fought over positions in government in a way that
threatened to establish a de facto confessional system such as exists in Lebanon.
The emergence of sectarian-based politics is also linked to the collapse of the
Iraqi state. At the time of the US invasion, Iraqi state institutions were mostly defunct
due to the impact of sanctions.17 The collapse of the state was hastened by the
debaathification policies of Bremer from May 2003, which removed the upper
echelons of management from the state apparatus. Yet post-invasion policies have
failed to rebuild state institutions. The imposition of timelines for the political
process, which has included a series of temporary governments, has greatly hampered
capacity building within state institutions and enabled an alarming growth in the
violation of human rights, including women’s rights, with impunity.18
Rather than reconstructing the state, coalition policies have helped to construct
a system of patron-client relations that link communally based parties to Iraqi citizens.
Members of various temporary cabinets have used their positions to provide goods
and services that are in scarce supply through other channels to mobilize a support
base. Given the high level of unemployment, one important mechanism of patron-
client relations has been access to jobs.19 Through the provision of basic goods and
services, communally organized parties have mobilized support not only among the
unemployed but also among women, who see the benefits of the provision of social
services and security by sectarian parties in their communities.20  
The constitution ratified by national referendum in October 2005 was meant to
represent an opportunity for national reconciliation among political factions. Instead,
it contributed to increasing sectarian differences—particularly over the issues of
federalism, the future of Kirkuk and the role of Islam in public life. Moreover,
negotiations over the constitution through the summer of 2005 demonstrated how
women’s rights have been sacrificed for the sake of political compromise. 
While the constitution enshrines women’s rights to public participation and,
significantly, allows Iraqi women to pass on their nationality to their children, it fails
to grant women equal rights within the family. Article 39 states that “Iraqis are free in
their adherence to their personal status according to their own religion, sect, belief and
choice, and that will be organized by law.” This realises the worst fears of many
women’s rights activists in that it opens the way for a Lebanese-type system, where
family law is governed according to religious sect, thereby legalizing discriminatory
practices with regard to marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance. The system
of federalism spelled out in Article 119 devolves authority to the regions to specify
family law, thereby allowing regional differences in family law.21 The outcome could
be a more secular-oriented, civil family code in Kurdistan and a religiously inspired,
conservative family code in the Shi‘i south. 
Indeed, certain secular-oriented women activists in the north backed the
constitution because of its guarantees for federalism, which, they believe, will ensure
that women’s rights are respected in the Kurdish region, where the already existing
17 Toby Dodge, “Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change,” Adelphi Paper 372 (London:
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005).
18 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, January 1-February 28, 2006 (Amman,
March 2006).
19 Glen Rangwala, “Democratic Transition and Its Limitations,” in Alex Danchev and John Macmillan,
eds. The Iraq War and Democratic Politics (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 174-175.
20 Women for Women International, Windows of Opportunity: The Pursuit of Gender Equality in
Post-War Iraq (Washington, DC, January 2005), pp. 18-19.
21 We thank Nathan Brown for pointing out that personal status laws are not designated as among the
areas decided by central government. Personal communication, September 2005.
regional government refused Resolution 137.22 Meanwhile, women elected on the
(largely Shi‘i) United Iraqi Alliance list generally support placing family law under
the shari‘a. For many, shari‘a-inspired legislation represents adherence to Iraq’s
Islamic identity, in contradistinction to the largely secular-inspired legislation of
Saddam’s Iraq. 
  
It is significant that family law has become a main arena in which contestation
over the future identity of the Iraqi nation-state occurs. Ba‘thist measures sought to
dismantle the authority of the male heads of family, clan and tribe over women and to
replace it with the authority of the state.23 The new constitution replaces state authority
over women with the authority of communal leaders of the different regions of Iraq—
whether Shi‘i, Sunni or Kurd. Family law is one of the mechanisms for consolidating
a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state on the basis of (religious-ethnic) difference
within the private sphere. By devolving family law to the regions, the state
accommodates social and religious differences, while encouraging the loyalty of
communal leaders to the state. Family law becomes part of a “social contract,” trading
communal autonomy for women’s rights.24 
Sacrificed, Not Supported
It is necessary to emphasize that women are not passive victims of the events
occurring in post-invasion Iraq. Despite deteriorating security, increasing violence and
the failure of reconstruction, many women continue to participate in the rebuilding of
their country by forming NGOs, advocating for women’s rights and participating in
the political process, whether as voters or candidates. 
It is not useful to compare women’s suffering under the regime of Saddam
Hussein with the suffering related to war and occupation. Such an approach
disempowers women, who are reduced to symbols of their community and
instruments of various political agendas. In contrast, it is important to acknowledge
that different women and men experienced the previous regime differently, not only
depending on ethnic and religious background, but also depending on social class and
political orientation. Despite efforts by international aid agencies and diaspora women
activists to support Iraqi women, however, it is necessary to highlight that the space
for Iraqi women’s empowerment is being eroded by the policies and realities of the
US-British occupation and the competition for power among different political actors
inside Iraq. In the name of establishing the new Iraq, women’s rights are being
sacrificed—not supported.
22 Associated Press, February 6, 2004.
23 Suad Joseph, “Elite Strategies for State Building: Women, Family, Religion and the State in Iraq and
Lebanon,” in Deniz Kandiyoti, ed. Women, Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1991), pp. 176–200.
24 Lisa Hajjar makes this argument with regard to Israel and India in her “Religion, State Power and
Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis,” Law and Social
Inquiry 29/1 (Winter 2004).
